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In this paper I will analyse the role of the imagination in Kant's discussion of the 
mathematical sublime. I will show that there are experiential possibilities within the 
mathematical sublime which far exceed the parameters envisaged by Kant. These 
possibilities will provide a useful contribution to contemporary debates concerning 
the sublime experience. I will begin with an elucidation of Kant’s thesis; however, I 
will argue that there are deductive inconsistencies to be found in the text.  I will argue 
that the failure of the imagination does not, as Kant argues, lie in the inability of the 
imagination to comprehend infinity,1 but in the inability of reason to comprehend a 
phenomenal totality. Not only does this contrasting analysis address various problems 
in Kant’s deduction, it also offers a more intuitive, clearer model of the mathematical 
sublime. I will then suggest a development of the analytic of the mathematical 
sublime which I offer for further consideration. Due to the constraints of length, I will 
not enter into a discussion of the validity of the sublime itself and will focus my 
analysis entirely on Kant's own analysis rather than that of secondary sources. 2 
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  Kant (1987), §26. 
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  The arguments in section three are developed from the challenges posed by my own analysis in the 
previous sections. However, footnotes will indicate where this section is indebted to Crowther's The 




I.  EXPLICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL SUBLIME  
Kant argues in the Critique of Judgment (CJ) that there are two distinct modes of the 
sublime. This essay will concentrate on the mathematical mode. It is helpful to begin 
an examination of the mathematical sublime by elucidating the difference between 
logical estimation and aesthetic estimation; it is aesthetic estimation under strain, so 
Kant argues, that instigates the moment of the sublime. Logical estimation forms the 
cognitive basis of scientific calculations.3 He argues that scientific enquiry only 
requires an understanding of the logical relationship of numbers and so does not 
require an aesthetic experience of those numbers.4  
 By contrast, in aesthetic estimation, one measures by sensible intuition rather than 
by a determinate logical calculation.5 Technically speaking, the imagination fulfills 
two roles in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude: “the imagination must perform two 
acts: apprehension (apprehensio), and comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica)”.6 
This is a very important point and marks a significant addition to the imagination's 
cognitive role qua determinate cognition. In order to appreciate fully the importance 
of this point we must briefly examine the role of the imagination in determinate 
cognition. By contrast, the significance of comprehensio aesthetica, as an additional 
role for the imagination, will become apparent.   
 In determinate cognition, the imagination apprehends, reproduces and 
synthesizes over time.7 The manifold of intuition is conceived as unified when it is 
subsumed under a determinate concept.8 When judging aesthetically that which is of 
average magnitude, or that which is merely large, the imagination is called upon, not 
only to apprehend the various sensuous intuitions of an object but also to comprehend 
these intuitions as a unified whole.9 There is no objective determination in an 
aesthetic judgment and so no other faculty is providing a unitary cognition of the 
object. However, there must be a complete representational unity of the object if we 
are to perform any act of measurement. Transcendentally, therefore, the imagination 
is required to fulfill this comprehensive operation.  
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  Kant (1987), §26. 
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  Kant (1987), §26. 
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  Kant (1987), §26. The use of the terms ‘comprehension’ or ‘imaginative comprehension’ will be a 
direct reference to comphrensio aesthetica. 
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 Furthermore, in the mathematical sublime, Kant argues that the object being 
judged is absolutely large.  Its magnitude is such that it could never be made small by 
comparison to something else which is larger.10 In the case of the absolutely large, the 
representation of the object is large beyond all comparison and therefore relies only 
on itself as a source of its aesthetic measure. Kant argues that the aesthetic measure 
itself is absolute as it is not a measure which requires comparison for completion; it is 
a necessary rather than contingent measure. As nothing in nature is large beyond all 
comparison then this absolute measure cannot be found in anything natural. This 
aesthetic estimation of the absolutely large must therefore refer to an absolute 
measure, the only absolute aesthetic measurement being infinity.11 Therefore when 
faced with the absolutely large, the imaginative comprehension is compelled into 
estimating the magnitude of an object by infinity itself.12 Yet one cannot generate an 
aesthetic comprehension of infinity; Kant argues that this striving of the imagination 
towards infinity, the attempt to comprehend by this absolute measure, marks the 
moment of the sublime.13  
 We have seen that the imagination is not compelled to measure such a 
representation by way of a basic measure but simply, yet with complete totality, 
comprehend the entirety of the object. Kant argues that, when faced with the 
absolutely large, the maximal limit of one's imaginative comprehension is soon 
reached.14 Total comprehension of infinity is beyond imaginative comprehension and 
results in the cognitive failure of imagination. Kant begins by situating the sublime in 
this moment: the striving for the infinite by the imagination, although unsuccessful, 
nevertheless stretches the imagination. The sublime is here “a liking for the expansion 
of the imagination itself”.15  
 What I have detailed here is the technical role of the imagination in the Kantian 
mathematical sublime. It is imperative to properly follow Kant's own formulation 
because it is within the specifics of his understanding of aesthetic estimation, and the 
measure by which we make this estimation, that I will argue that there are interesting, 
unacknowledged possibilities for a sublime experience. 
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II.  REASON’S DEMAND FOR A TOTALITY OF COMPREHENSION 
The preceding outlines the initial cognitive activity of the imagination. As our 
imagination engages with a seemingly infinite number of representations of a vast 
(absolutely large) object, it fails to cohere them in a unified whole. However, Kant 
argues there are further conditions required to complete a deductively sound and 
psychologically satisfactory account of the mathematical sublime. These conditions 
can be located through the following enquiry: If the imagination is failing, or seems 
likely to fail, why must it embark on a task which it will never achieve and only does 
violence to itself?   
 The answer to this concern is to be found in a discussion of the faculty of reason16. 
For Kant, it is reason that drives the imagination towards its limit, it is reason that 
supplies this 'absolute measure' and it is reason that always requires totality of 
comprehension.17 Reason is indifferent to the plight of the imagination in its attempt 
to comprehend the absolutely large. It is, however, in the coercion of the imagination 
by reason, in its demand for totality, that the mathematical sublime is transcendentally 
completed. But in this move, Kant’s treatment of the mathematical sublime grows in 
complexity considerably.    
 Reaching our aesthetic limit would, therefore, produce an emotion of 
displeasure. However, to suggest that this moment is sublime would appear to ground 
sublimity in the moment of imaginative failure. Kant inverts this stance, suggesting 
instead that the attempt by the imagination to comprehend the absolutely large 
actually stretches the comprehensive potential of the imagination. Therefore, the 
initial displeasure experienced in the failure of the imagination is then offset by the 
very striving of the imagination which can secure the positive moment of the sublime: 
“this liking [for the sublime] is by no means a liking for the object … but rather a 
liking for the expansion of the imagination itself.”18   
 Having noted the essential role of reason in both driving the imagination 
towards its limits and also providing a logical basis upon which a liking for this 
limitation could be postulated, it is necessary to examine the ramifications for the role 
of reason in the sublime experience. Indeed, it is my contention that important 
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  All usage of the term ‘reason’ will be a reference to the Category of the ‘Reason’; see Kant (1996), 
A299 – 310. 
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  Kant (1987), §26.   
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  Kant (1987), §25. It should be noted that there are ambiguities in the text here concerning the basis 




ambiguities are introduced to Kant's analysis at this point. Furthermore, these 
ambiguities will be vital for developing the role of the imagination in sublime 
experiences and, in turn, for revealing other possible locations of such experiences. 
 Through §§25 and 26, Kant argues that the aesthetic measure is in fact a 
measurement according to the notion of infinity. In other words, the aesthetic measure 
is the measure of infinity. However, it is not clear that this move is essential. Kant 
argues for this conflation of concepts in the following movement: the absolutely large 
is not large by comparison but is large within and of itself. That is to say, this measure 
cannot come from nature, it must come from the subject’s faculty of reason.19 A 
schism in the argument occurs at this juncture:  there is a maximal aesthetic measure 
which relates to that which is considered aesthetically to be absolutely large i.e., the 
object whose presentation appears vast to the point of being absolutely large.20 
Alternatively, the conceptual notion of the absolutely large, as it is large beyond 
comparison, is by implication infinitely large because only by this measure could its 
size be estimated as being beyond all comparison.   
 I am therefore suggesting that the concept ‘absolutely large’ is suspended 
between purely aesthetic - sensible - measurement and the logical demands of 
reason's idea of infinity. Yet, more intuitively, there is that which appears to be 
absolutely large. Imagination's maximal comprehension is reached in the attempted 
comprehension of that which appears to be absolutely large, yet the necessity of 
infinite imaginative comprehension is not necessarily invoked. The difference 
between these two conceptions of the absolutely large is as follows: that which is 
logically absolutely large and gives rise to the absolute measure [of infinity] and that 
which, by reaching the maximal measure of imaginative comprehension, is 
phenomenally absolutely large. Both conceptions satisfy the necessary condition for 
the mathematical sublime; in both cases there is a maximal limit. Kant writes: 
 
For when apprehension has reached the point where the partial presentations of sensible 
intuition that were first apprehended are already beginning to be extinguished in the 
imagination, as it proceeds to apprehend further ones, the imagination then loses as much 
on the one side as it gains in the other; and so there is a maximum in comprehension that it 
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cannot exceed.21  
 
This maximal limit is a necessary condition for the experiencing of the sublime as it 
instigates a failure of the imagination. Neither conception requires a comparative 
estimation - i.e., a determinative mathematical estimation - but are both constituted by 
comprehensio aesthetica. If this were so, I would ask why are we compelled to utilise 
the logical conception if the phenomenal will suffice? Even if an absolute aesthetic 
measure implies an infinite insofar as the maximal limit of aesthetic comprehension is 
reached, there is no logical necessity for the imagination to strive towards infinity and 
use infinity as the aesthetic measure of the absolutely large. What we are seeing here 
is the beginnings of a breakdown in the traditional conception of a sublime 
experience, one which is wedded to logical rather than phenomenal parameters.   
 The above analysis of the absolute measure also informs a distinction between 
that which is logically absolutely large and that which is phenomenally absolutely 
large. For Kant, reason’s idea of infinity is that which is logically absolutely large.22 
However, even Kant’s own examples suggest an absolutely large that could be 
derived from a phenomenal object.23 It should be clear from the preceding analysis 
that that which is logically of absolute magnitude is infinite, and that which is 
phenomenally absolutely large, is vast beyond aesthetic comprehension. 
 In arguing against the necessity of a logical measure of the absolutely large, the 
emphasis of the mathematical sublime shifts towards the problem of the phenomena 
themselves and the challenges those phenomena present to the imagination.  In short, 
there are a vast number of intuitions to be cohered in any object if it is to be 
comprehended in its totality. Rather than the imagination comprehending a measure of 
infinity, the challenge to the imagination becomes the aesthetic comprehension of any 
phenomenal totality in its entirety. That is to say, in comprehending those aspects of an 
object that are not accessible from a given viewpoint, an experience of the 
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III. FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION:  A MATHEMATICAL SUBLIME OF THE AVERAGE 
MAGNITUDE? 
I have undermined Kant’s argument that the absolutely large should be measured by 
the aesthetic measure of infinity. In light of this criticism I would ask, does the 
experience of the mathematical sublime still require vast objects?  Within the 
framework of the aesthetic measure of infinity, Kant consistently argues for 
absolutely large or vast objects being the focus of experiences of sublimity. I will now 
draw this essay to a close by suggesting that, although vast objects do instigate the 
sublime, they do not do so exclusively. In fact a deduction of the mathematical 
sublime from average sized objects is also possible. In a paper of this length, I do not 
present this problem as decisive but instead I offer it for the further consideration of 
the reader and a possible avenue of further study concerning Kant's mathematical 
sublime. Nevertheless, if such a lacuna exists in Kant's analytic, as I argue it does, 
then there are significant ramifications for the teleology of Kant's third Critique 
regarding the concept of purposiveness. 
 Catalysing the sublime through a ‘phenomenal totality’ marks a significant point 
of departure from the mathematical sublime as conceived by Kant himself. Having 
attacked Kant’s requirement for the absolutely large being measured by infinity, 
maximal imaginative comprehension in relation to phenomenal extremity supplants 
magnitude as the focal point for the mathematical sublime. The implications of this 
position are highlighted by the fact that it would seem to admit a mathematical 
sublime of the minute or the ‘tiny’.25 Undoubtedly Kant would be unhappy with such 
a movement but one must remember the experience of the sublime is marked by a 
complex feeling of displeasure in the failure of the imagination which is in turn 
recuperated by the pleasure taken in superiority of the law of reason. If this criterion is 
satisfied then the feeling, as an experience of the sublime, is arguably valid. 
 In light of this divergence, one must question the necessity of phenomenal 
extremity itself (i.e. the object being vast or minute) as a necessary condition for the 
sublime. For example, what are the implications for the mathematical sublime when 
considering the phenomenal totality of everyday, averagely-sized objects such as cars, 
houses, etc.?26 It is my contention that such objects, when conceived as phenomenal 
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totalities, present a potential problem for aesthetic comprehension.   
 Despite the fact that I have argued against the necessity of infinity being the 
absolute measure in aesthetic estimation, the integral role of reason and its demand for 
absolute comprehension still requires that the entirety of any phenomenal unity must 
be comprehended. The logical totality of reason’s demand cannot be compromised or 
qualified if it is still to be reason’s demand. As such, is it really simple to imagine, 
absolutely, the phenomenal totality of a house and even those aspects of the house 
unavailable to the perceiver due to location? One can certainly imaginatively 
comprehend a house and all its constituent parts with sufficient detail to determine it 
as a bounded totality. But this is not the same as comprehending, by the law of reason, 
the complete phenomenal totality of an object. 
 The specific facet of the mathematical sublime being brought into question here 
is the stipulation of boundlessness or formlessness in the object’s appearance. The 
absolutely large object reaches the maximal aesthetic limit of the subject before 
sufficient aesthetic comprehension can be achieved, therefore the object appears 
boundless. In this sense, the absolutely large object is necessarily too large for 
aesthetic comprehension.   
 The thought that I wish to draw the reader's attention towards is the possibility 
of experiencing the mathematical sublime through a bounded object. It is certainly 
true that aesthetic comprehension of the small or the averagely-sized can be achieved 
without difficulty because, in Kantian terms, the subject can perceive a sufficient 
number of intuitions to synthesise a particular manifold which can then be subsumed 
under a determinate concept. In other words, the subject perceives sufficient intuitions 
of various parts of an object before the limits of her imagination are taxed. This is an 
unsurprising point, since without the possibility of this cognitive activity, everyday 
experience would be jeopardised. However, the sufficient intuitions of our everyday 
comprehension are not necessarily identical with the entirety of the phenomenal 
complexity of an object. It is my argument that, contrary to Kant's thesis, an attempt 
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